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 A Very Brief History of Moral Psychology leading to the Schwartz-Duval Framework:

In my first guest blog (thanks, Jonathan) I presented aspects of my work on moral psychology, as it related to the work of Jonathan Haidt and colleagues (hereafter referred to, collectively, as Haidt or Haidt’s work). Specifically, I highlighted what I perceived to be deficiencies in Moral Foundations Theory when compared to Schwartz’s Theory of Basic Values (see 2012 for overview of that model[i]). Schwartz’s model was considered alongside a number of others by Haidt, and as such contributed to Moral Foundations Theory. The primary issues I noted with this move from Schwartz to Haidt was the lack of values from the Openness to Change quadrant, namely Hedonism, Stimulation, and Self-Direction. An additional concern, detailed in my prior post, was the failure to recognise both the importance, and breadth of available definitions, of Fairness. Through a series of experiments I supported my hypotheses that: 1) people would recognise that Hedonism, Stimulation, and Self-Direction are moral concerns (and thus missing from Moral Foundations Theory), and; 2) that fairness is a means by which other values can be represented.

In this post, I’m going to go back to the various models that I included in my literature review, including Piaget, Maslow, Kohlberg, Gordon, and Shweder, and the means by which I integrated them into what I believe to be a cohesive whole, and I’ll discuss the importance of work from George Lakoff (over and above the aspects of Fairness mentioned in my last post), and Martin L. Hoffman (see 2000/2007 for a book-length review[ii]), as part of a mechanism of moral education; the means by which values are discovered, taught, and reinforced (though this will mostly be discussed in a later post). I’ll also explain why I think that self-construal (Cross, Hardin & Gercek Swing, 2011[iii]; Trafimow, Triandis & Goto, 1991[iv]) and an equilibrium in that construal (Kumashiro, Rusbult & Finkel, 2008[v]) are important for any model of values and morality, and then introduce the revamped model.

Developmental stage theories

Whilst no review of moral psychology is complete without mentioning the work of Jean Piaget, I don’t want to dwell on his work, except to say that it is important to note that his Theory of Cognitive Development (Piaget, 1936[vi]) was followed by The Moral Judgment of the Child 1965/1997[vii]). The first book was on children’s development in response to the general environment, and their increasingly social nature, where the second is the child’s response to the social environment. Kohlberg picked up where Piaget left off, adopting a stage approach, and utilizing dilemmas to elicit responses from participants. Of course, Haidt cites this focus on reasoning as one of his motivating concerns with Kohlberg, and uses many quotes to support his claims (see Haidt, 2001[viii], p. 816).

However, here is Kohlberg discussing his work, and why reasoning was the focus of interest:

 “…our work focuses on the cognitive structures that underlie such content and give it its claim to the category “moral,” where “structure” refers to “the general characteristics of shape, pattern or organization of response rather than to the rate of intensity of response or its pairing with particular stimuli,” and “cognitive structure” refers to “rules for processing information or for connecting experienced events.” From our point of view it is not any artificially specified set of responses, or degree of intensity of such responses, which characterizes morality as an area of study. Rather, it is the cognitive moral structurings, or the organized systems of assumptions and rules about the nature of moral conflict situations which give such situations their meaning, that constitute the objects of our developmental study.” (Boyd & Kohlberg, 1973, as cited in Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977[ix], p. 56).

This strikes me as a discussion about reasoning as a means to ascertain what lessons about moral interactions have been learned, and internalized, and what therefore shapes one’s intuitions. I certainly think that Haidt is correct when he said that moral reasoning is often deployed for the purpose of excuse-making and public status management. However, if the demand characteristics of an experiment are such that there’s no reason for a person to reason in a self-defensive way, as opposed to being put on the spot by an experimenter, and asked to justify reasons for being against incest, then people will provide some indication of their actual thought process. As Mercier and Sperber (2011[x]) put it, “people are good at assessing arguments and are quite able to do so in an unbiased way, provided they have no particular axe to grind” (p. 72). Presumably status management is the ultimate axe one can have to grind as a member of a social species; the ultimate driver to biased (motivated) reasoning (e.g. Kahan, 2012[xi]). So, whilst most contemporary psychologists no longer agree with Kohlberg, he seems right about the influence of rational deliberation (see Bloom, 2013[xii]), a point on which Sinnott-Armstrong (2010, p. 342[xiii]) concurs.

Where Kohlberg was clearly wrong was with the idea that once one ‘leveled up’ in one’s reasoning style that one doesn’t regress. One need merely be in the presence of an otherwise sensible adult who is tired, or hangry, or drunk, or indeed euphorically happy, to know that’s not the case. This is not to say that a stage theory is without merit, just that it is more complicated than such an essentialist view would allow for.  Kohlberg’s stages did seem to bear some comparison with Schwartz (and there is a logical relationship between values and morals). My initial thinking involved looking at an apparent compatibility between Maslow’s (1943) ‘Hierarchy of Needs’ (see Koltko-Rivera, 2006[xiv] for a review), Kohlberg’s (1963) ‘Stages of Moral Development’ (see Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977 for a review), and Schwartz’s (1992[xv]) ‘Model of Values’, though ignoring a rigid progression. My inclusion of Maslow relates to the fact that Schwartz’s model talks about Values and Motivations (the latter being higher order values). Motivations can be seen to relate to the functional needs of the human organism.

Table 1: Maslow’s (1969) ‘Hierarchy of Needs’, Schwartz’s (1992) ‘Model of Values’, Kohlberg’s (1963) ‘Stages of Moral Development’, as a succession of inter-related stage theories.
Table 1: Maslow’s (1969) ‘Hierarchy of Needs’, Schwartz’s (1992) ‘Model of Values’, Kohlberg’s (1963) ‘Stages of Moral Development’, as a succession of inter-related stage theories.

If one looks at the more fully descriptive explanations of the individual levels of these models this alignment is pretty good. Some of the words look incongruous next to each other without those fuller explanations, and some that look plausible here, look less so at the deeper level of description. This combination, however, makes more sense in light of a mechanism by which to achieve it, such as Frederickson’s (2001, p. 218[xvi]) ‘Broaden and Build’ Theory of positive emotion, “experiences of positive emotions broaden people’s momentary thought-action repertoires, which in turn serves to build their enduring personal resources, ranging from physical and intellectual resources to social and psychological resources.” It may be that these stage models could stand some revision if a stronger, interlinking, Needs->Motivations/Values->Morals model can be developed. Certainly, as alluded to above, if an individual’s physiological needs are not being met, then they are more likely to be open to the theft of food. If an individual’s needs are being met, and they are focused on a Law and Order orientation, they are more likely to be against theft.

A complaint against Maslow is that the stages don’t reflect the realities of cultural variation (Tay & Diener, 2011), or that it is outright ethnocentric (Hofstede, 1984[xvii]), or that it is too rigidly grounded in the idea of stages (Kenrick, Griskevicius, Neuberg & Schaller, 2010[xviii]). Similar claims abound for Kohlberg. Carol Gilligan (1982[xix]) describes Kohlberg’s model as androcentric, which finds reflection in a complaint about Maslow failing to take into account parenting (Kenrick, et al., 2010). Whilst the Schwartz model does bear being presented as a stage model, it seems clear that the Universalism, which is the last value under Self-Transcendence, is a logical pre-cursor to the Self-Direction that is the first value under Openness to Change. In connecting the three models together, a number of complaints about Maslow and Kohlberg (actual stage models) are answered by connecting them via Schwartz (not a stage model). So, whilst these models all reflect an overall progression, they also characterize smaller progressions (which nicely fits with the idea of recursion in the human mind, e.g. Corballis, 2014[xx]).

 Descriptive theories

The Schwartz model, as a circumplex (see Fig. 2), rather than as stages, is descriptive of human values in a general sense. The methodology by which it was devised was explicitly neutral, and pan-cultural (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001[xxi]), relying on multiple samples (Schwartz, 1994; 2012) and confirmatory factor analysis (Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004[xxii]). The circumplex seems to bear a striking resemblance to Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic and Mertz’s (2007[xxiii]) “Group-Grid Worldview” model (a reworking of Douglas, 1970[xxiv] & 1982[xxv]; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982[xxvi]). This model is made up of two continua, Individualist to Communitarian, and Hierarchist to Egalitarian (see Fig. 3). The particular orientation of the circumplex presented below lines up well with the Group-Grid Worldview, thereby illustrating the political left and right. Or at least that’s what I initially thought. I now tend to think that the Group-Grid model needs to be rotated counter-clockwise by 45 degrees to fit properly over Schwartz’s circumplex.

Figure 1: Shalom Schwartz’s (1992) model of values, as presented in Maio, et al. (2014).
Figure 1: Shalom Schwartz’s (1992) model of values, as presented in Maio, et al. (2014).

 

Figure 2: This depiction of Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic and Mertz’s (2007) ‘GroupGrid WorldView’ is flipped over as compared to the original in which hierarchist was at the top, and egalitarian was at the bottom.
Figure 2: This depiction of Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic and Mertz’s (2007) ‘GroupGrid WorldView’ is flipped over as compared to the original in which hierarchist was at the top, and egalitarian was at the bottom.

This orientation of Schwartz’s circumplex, to my mind, illustrates the left/right divide, but also its primary deficiency: it’s a false dichotomy. It seems to me that having hierarchical individualism straddling the left/right divide adequately explains why we have left-leaning and right-leaning libertarians – they tend toward hierarchical individualism. Some of these hierarchical individualists are driven more by hedonistic concerns (hence, why, of all so-called right-wingers, libertarians most often support marijuana legalization). Others are more driven by power. All seem to focus on personal achievement, which is the basis of hierarchy. In opposition we have what Haidt referred to as the religious left, who have benevolence as a central trait, the more left-leaning of these tending towards universalism; the more religious tending toward conformity and tradition.

This left/right split was described by George Lakoff, in his seminal work, Moral Politics (2002[xxvii]), which followed on from his work on the use of metaphors as organising concepts (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2008[xxviii]). According to Lakoff (2002), a nation is a metaphorical family; right-wing politics is underpinned by a ‘Strict Father’ metaphor, and left-wing politics, a ‘Nurturant Parent’ approach (see also Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967[xxix]). However, the traditional family at the centre of the ‘Strict Father’ metaphor may be the subject of ideological revisionism (see Coontz, 1992[xxx]; Levinson & Huffman, 1955[xxxi]). It seems obvious to say that a given family is a product of the way that parents run that family, and the environment in which the family exists. The moral education that a family structure provides must impact on an individual’s beliefs about politics, just as parental attachment impacts on an individual’s beliefs about romantic love (e.g. Hazan & Shaver, 1987[xxxii]; Fraley & Shaver, 2000[xxxiii]).

Another dichotomy with implications for morality comes from dual-process theory (see Kahneman, 2003[xxxiv], for an overview, and Sunstein, 2005[xxxv] for its application to morality). Dual-process theory is discussed at some length by Haidt (2001, p. 819-825) in his orienting of Social Intuition Theory. As mentioned in the discussion of Kohlberg, I think Haidt is wrong about the implications. The two processes that make up dual-process theory are intuition and reasoning, but are generally discussed under the more neutral titles of System 1 and System 2, respectively. System 1 is seen as effortless, automatic, and as such, often governed by habit; System 2 is effortful, requiring control, and thus potentially rule-based. According to Kahneman (2003, p. 1451) “System 2 monitors the activities of System 1.” This has echoes in Kohlberg’s developmental view (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). For example, a child at the Punishment-and-Obedience stage is learning rules – repeated exposure to these rules makes adhering to them habitual – moving them from cognitive to intuitive. This enables the child to progress to the next stage. Martin L. Hoffman (2000/2007[xxxvi], p. 3) refers to this process as “moral internalization”, and it forms part of his theory of moral development. Hoffman’s theory observes the importance of empathy, and explicitly describes the importance of the split between intuition and reasoning. For example, in the example of the hungry thief: someone with a Law & Order orientation and low empathy will punish the hungry thief; someone with the same orientation, but high empathy, would not. But even someone with high empathy, if they are hangry, or drunk, or euphoric, may reason (or deploy intuition) differently. It is worth noting that anxiety also negatively
impacts ‘System 2’
(e.g. Derakshan & Eysenck, 
2009[xxxvii]), and that Schwartz (2012) has accounted for this in developing a depiction of his model showing the impact of anxiety (see Fig. 3).

Figure 4: The Schwartz model presented as responses to anxiety-inducing stimuli, and degree of personal or social focus.
Figure 4: The Schwartz model presented as responses to anxiety-inducing stimuli, and degree of personal or social focus.

The impact of rational deliberation outside one’s area of intuitive preference – something that one only engages in when not anxious or focused elsewhere – has support from Emler, Renwick, and Malone (1983). In their study, conservative participants directed to think like a liberal, were more inclined to engage in post-conventional moral reasoning (the highest level in Kohlberg’s model), where their usual level of moral reasoning was conventional (‘Law and Order Orientation’ and ‘Interpersonal Concordance Orientation’). This indicates that such individuals are cognitively capable of engaging in more complex moral reasoning, but that they don’t habitually do so, or are generally in an environment that is not conducive to doing so. Along similar lines, Klein and Hodges (2001) found that when males are encouraged to be more empathetic, any stereotypical female advantage with empathy disappears. The impact of empathy on moral development is key to Hoffman’s (2000) model, and seems to underpin the split in Lakoff’s (2002) nurturant parent/strict father dichotomy, which I would suggest is also, respectively, the left and the right, and the personal and the societal.

The personal and the societal are reflected in the Autonomy and Community of Shweder, Much, Mahapatra and Park’s (1997) ‘Big Three’ – the third being Divinity. Recall that Haidt leans fairly heavily on Shweder’s work (see, particularly, Graham, et al., 2011), but Shweder is talking about the entirely cognitive process of post hoc rationalization of occurrences in the world, i.e. generating narratives to explain suffering. Further, as mentioned previously, Schwartz (2012) noted that Spirituality (comparable to divinity) was originally tested as a universal value, but failed to achieve consistency across cultures, and in the samples where it did show up, the underlying values were split between Benevolence and Tradition (Schwartz, 1994), which are “issues related to binding groups together” (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009, p. 1044), and as such should be under ‘Community’. However, religion has gained undue influence in establishing itself as distinct from ‘community’, which may explain the unnatural subsuming of spirituality (a private matter) into the communal (a public matter), as discussed previously. According to Saroglou (2010), the big four dimensions of religiosity are “Believing, Bonding, Behaving, and Belonging” (p. 1320), all of which are concerns about the community, but for believing, which is the basis of acceptance into the community.

Acceptance into a community is a means by which security is gained. One taps into the power of that community (i.e. ‘safety in numbers’, but also ‘might makes right’), and one has only to observe the rules – conformity and tradition – to retain access to that power. Note, however, that this need not be the behaviour of an individual in a genuinely hostile environment; tradition and conformity also have the benefit of reducing exposure to those things that might cause one to need to make difficult decisions, or become anxious. Recall that benevolence, as discussed by Schwartz, is “Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact”, and thus is only kindness towards those who conform to the same traditions as you – those whose behaviour is likely to be predictable.

Along similar lines, Bob Altemeyer (2006) had this to say of the extremely conservative (authoritarian) personality:

“…first of all you avoid challenges by sticking with your own kind as much as possible, because they’re hardly likely to ask pointed questions about your beliefs. But if you meet someone who does, you’ll probably defend your ideas as best you can, parrying thrusts with whatever answers your authorities have pre-loaded into your head. If these defenses crumble, you may go back to the trusted sources. They probably don’t have to give you a convincing refutation of the anxiety-producing argument that breached your defenses, just the assurance that you nonetheless are right. But if the arguments against you become overwhelming and persistent, you either concede the point–which may put the whole lot at risk–or you simply insist you are right and walk away, clutching your beliefs more tightly than ever.” (p. 93)

Similar behaviour, though to a lesser extent, can be seen in less authoritarian individuals. From the hierarchist who believes in structure, even to the detriment of individuals within that structure, to communitarians, whose primary concern is the community of which they are part, possibly to the detriment of themselves. This being the case, the Need for Cognitive Closure (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway, 2003) seems to be a central concern for the right (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti & De Grada, 2006[xxxviii]). As a balance-point between Need for Cognition and Need for Closure, the final element of the model that I want to put forth, and one that seems to be implied rather than stated in most work on morality, is the individual’s self-construal (Cross, Hardin & Gercek Swing, 2011[xxxix]; Trafimow, Triandis & Goto, 1991[xl]; Kumashiro, Rusbult & Finkel, 2008[xli]), which is to say how one views oneself with respect to expectations of the private self, the social self, the idealized self, and so on. Beliefs about oneself must necessarily form the basis of one’s beliefs about the self in the world. This seems to put the self at the centre of a radial category.

A germane description of a radial category comes from George Lakoff:

“[An] example of a radial category is forms of harm. The central case is physical harm. But the category also includes kinds of harm that are metaphorically understood in terms of physical harm, e.g. financial harm, political harm, social harm, and psychological harm. Our courts recognize that these are all forms of harm, for which the most severe penalties are reserved.

Radial categories, with central cases and variations on them, are normal in the human mind. … The theory of radial categories allows us to account for both the central tendencies and the variations” (Lakoff, 2002, p. 8).

If we take the self as the central case, then values represent central sub-categories, rules by which we alter our self-definition in response to stimuli in our environment (if only temporarily). Recall that “Values are (1) beliefs about (2) goals or behaviours, that are (3) trans-situational, and (4) evaluative of individuals, acts, and occurrences that (5) stand in relation to each other and thereby (6) establish an implicit moral system” (Schwartz, 1992[xlii]). Values must be evaluative of the self and one’s own acts, as they relate to one’s own goals and behaviours, as well (but whether that is the private self or the public self is another matter).

Bearing all of this in mind, I set out to give Schwartz’s circumplex a revamp, particularly in light of his social/personal, anxiety-based/anxiety-free reworking. I wanted to include the Group-Grid worldview of Kahan, et al. (2007), given its apparent congruence with, and helpful additions to, Schwartz’s model. As with Haidt’s exploration of Libertarians, I felt it important to include the Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982[xliii]), and to balance that with the Need for Cognitive Closure (Jost, et al. 2003), as its functional opposite. Finally, given my disagreement with Schwartz about the position of spirituality (as opposed to religion), I felt it opportune to ditch the term ‘hedonism’, which to my mind comes with too much (primarily religious) baggage. I replaced hedonism with self-discovery (a term that is aligned with scientific curiosity, and conceptions of spirituality, but less so with religion). This term encapsulates the appetitive and aversive aspects of hedonism, but without the negative connotations. One can discover oneself through engaging in indulgent sensual acts that would set the purity alarm ringing for the overtly religious (illustrating the appetitive/aversive relationship that purity is a traditionalized/socialized version of), but equally one can learn just by noticing how one feels (i.e. good or bad) in a given circumstance.

Figure 5: The Schwartz-Duval Framework, incorporating the Left/Right dichotomy, the Group-Grid Worldview, the Schwartz circumplex, Need for Cognition, Need for Closure, and the tendencies of Spirituality, Politics, Religion, and Self-Governance.
Figure 5: The Schwartz-Duval Framework, incorporating the Left/Right dichotomy, the Group-Grid Worldview, the Schwartz circumplex, Need for Cognition, Need for Closure, and the tendencies of Spirituality, Politics, Religion, and Self-Governance.

In light of the model I am presenting, I want to suggest that whilst a given political orientation may have its central tendencies in a given quadrant, individuals will tend to have preferences that take up one (usually contiguous) half of the circumplex. So, to use the libertarian example again, the primary elements of the libertarian view may be self-discovery, achievement, and power, and the libertarian half may be completed with the addition of stimulation and security. However, a left-leaning libertarian may consider issues of self-direction through to power (making them only slightly right of many liberals). A right-leaning libertarian, by contrast, might inhabit the half between self-discovery-achievement and conformity-tradition (making them only slightly left of many conservatives). It seems that the degree to which one has internalized, and is thus intuitively familiar with, a particular value, the more idealized its opposing value becomes. Hence, whilst few libertarians would have internalized views of freedom (as described by the values they have internalized above), they do have an idealized view of freedom. Equally, a highly religious person, who values Conformity, Tradition, and Benevolence will have a highly idealized view of self-discovery (re-birth?) – and this explains why religious views are against profane expressions of self-discovery (i.e. drug use, pre-marital sex, homosexual sex, and so forth). More broadly, the right idealizes the individual from an internalized view of society, and the left idealizes society from an internalized view of the self… and centrists probably wonder what the hell everyone is on about.

In my next post I will discuss more of the internal logic of this model as it relates to deriving various morals and moralities from the values that have been internalized, and the values that are idealized.

NOTES

[i] Schwartz, S. H. (2012). An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values. Online Readings in Psychology and Culture, 2(1). http://dx.doi.org/10.9707/230720919.1116

[ii] Hoffman, M. L. (2000/2007). Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[iii] Cross, S. E., Hardin, E. E. & Gercek Swing, B. (2011). The what, how, why, and where of self-construal. Personality and Social Psychology Review 15, 142–179.

[iv] Trafimow, D., Triandis, H. C., & Goto, S. G. (1991). Some tests of the distinction between the private self and the collective self.. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 649-655.

[v] Kumashiro, M., Rusbult, C. E., & Finkel, E. J. (2008). Navigating personal and relational concerns: the quest for equilibrium. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(1), 94-110.

[vi] Piaget, J. (1936). Origin of Intelligence in the Child. London: Rutledge & Kegan Paul Publications.

[vii] Piaget, J. (1965/1997). The Moral Judgement of the Child. New York: Free Press Paperbacks.

[viii] Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108(4), 814-834.

[ix] Kohlberg, L., & Hersh, R. H. (1977). Moral development: A review of the theory. Theory into practice, 16(2), 53-59.

[x] Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011). Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory. Behavioral and brain sciences, 34(02), 57-74.

[xi] Kahan, D. M. (2012). Ideology, motivated reasoning, and cognitive reflection: an experimental study. Judgment and Decision Making, 8, 407-24.

[xii] Bloom, P. (2013). Just Babies: The Origins of Good and Evil. New York: Broadway Books.

[xiii] Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2010). Moral intuitionism meets empirical psychology. In T. Horgan & M. Timmons (Eds.), Metaethics after Moore (pp. 339-366). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[xiv] Koltko-Rivera, M. E. (2006). Rediscovering the later version of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs: Self-transcendence and opportunities for theory, research, and unification. Review of General Psychology, 10(4), 302-317.

[xv] Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 25(1), 1265.

[xvi] Fredrickson, B. L. (2001). The role of positive emotions in positive psychology: The broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions. American Psychologist, 56(3), 218-226.

[xvii] Hofstede, G. (1984). The cultural relativity of the quality of life concept. Academy of Management Review, 9(3), 389-398.

[xviii] Kenrick, D. T., Griskevicius, V., Neuberg, S. L., & Schaller, M. (2010). Renovating the pyramid of needs contemporary extensions built upon ancient foundations. Perspectives on psychological science, 5(3), 292-314.

[xix] Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice. Harvard University Press.

[xx] Corballis, M. C. (2014). The Recursive Mind: The Origins of Human Language, Thought, and Civilization. Princeton University Press.

[xxi] Schwartz, S. H., & Bardi, A. (2001). Value hierarchies across cultures taking a similarities perspective. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32(3), 268-290.

[xxii] Schwartz, S. H., & Boehnke, K. (2004). Evaluating the structure of human values with confirmatory factor analysis. Journal of Research in Personality, 38(3), 230-255.

[xxiii] Kahan, D. M., Braman, D., Gastil, J., Slovic, P., & Mertz, C. K. (2007). Culture and identity-protective cognition: Explaining the white-male effect in risk perception. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 4(3), 465-505.

[xxiv] Douglas, M. (1970) Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology. London: Barrie &

Rockliff.

[xxv] Douglas, M. (1982) “Cultural Bias,” in In the Active Voice. London/Boston: Routledge & Paul.

[xxvi] Douglas, M., & A. B. Wildavsky (1982) Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of

Technical and Environmental Dangers. Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press.

[xxvii] Lakoff, G. (2002). Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think (2nd Ed.). London: University of Chicago Press.

[xxviii] Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980a/2008). Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[xxix] Hoffman, M. L., & Saltzstein, H. D. (1967). Parent discipline and the child’s moral development. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5(1), 45-57.

[xxx] Coontz, S. (1992). The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap. New York: Basic Books.

[xxxi] Levinson, D. J., & Huffman, P. E. (1955). Traditional Family Ideology and Its Relation to Personality. Journal of Personality, 23(3), 251-273.

[xxxii] Hazan, C., & Shaver, P. (1987). Romantic love conceptualized as an attachment process. Journal of personality and social psychology, 52(3), 511.

[xxxiii] Fraley, R. C., & Shaver, P. R. (2000). Adult romantic attachment: Theoretical developments, emerging controversies, and unanswered questions. Review of General Psychology, 4(2), 132.

[xxxiv] Kahneman, D. (2003). Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behavioral economics. The American Economic Review, 93(5), 1449-1475.

[xxxv] Sunstein, C. R. (2005). Moral heuristics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(4), 531-541.

[xxxvi] Hoffman, M. L. (2000/2007). Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[xxxvii] Derakshan, N., & Eysenck, M. W. (2009). Anxiety, processing efficiency, and cognitive performance. European&Psychologist,&14(2), 1682176.

[xxxviii] Kruglanski, A. W., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., & De Grada, E. (2006). Groups as epistemic providers: need for closure and the unfolding of group-centrism. Psychological Review, 113(1), 84-100.

[xxxix] Cross, S. E., Hardin, E. E. & Gercek Swing, B. (2011). The what, how, why, and where of self-construal. Personality and Social Psychology Review 15, 142–179.

[xl] Trafimow, D., Triandis, H. C., & Goto, S. G. (1991). Some tests of the distinction between the private self and the collective self.. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 649-655.

[xli] Kumashiro, M., Rusbult, C. E., & Finkel, E. J. (2008). Navigating personal and relational concerns: the quest for equilibrium. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(1), 94-110.

[xlii] Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 25(1), 1-65.

[xliii] Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42(1), 116-131.